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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is an honor to be invited to contribute to this symposium for a scholar 
and friend who truly merits a term I do not use lightly: mentor.1  Professor 
Michael Risinger spent hours discussing some of my early articles with me, 
leading to vast improvements in their expression, argumentation, and wit.  
As I became a target for aggrieved forensic practitioners whose discipline I 
had questioned, Michael’s and colleagues’ writings became a model for my 
efforts at rebuttal through careful and methodological argumentation and, 
again, the occasional touch of wit.2  Later, Michael was candid enough to tell 
me when I learned that lesson perhaps too well.3 
I am especially flattered that Michael invited me to contribute to this 
symposium by “using my science studies chops.”  Michael’s outsider’s 
explication of the sociology of science using my work as an example, which 
he delivered at Professor Caudill’s symposium in 2006, remains a classic 
piece of writing about science studies—at least to me.4  In this passage, 
 
* Professor, Department of Criminology, Law & Society, University of California, Irvine. 
       1  Two such people are retiring this year. The other is William Thompson.   
 2  E.g., D. Michael Risinger et al., Brave New ‘Post-Daubert World’—A Reply to 
Professor Moenssens, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 405 (1998).   
 3  E.g., Simon A. Cole, Don’t Shoot the Messenger By One of the Messengers: A 
Response to Merlino et al., 45 TULSA L. REV. 111 (2009).   
 4  D. Michael Risinger, The Irrelevance, and Central Relevance, of the Boundary 
Between Science and Non-Science in the Evaluation of Expert Witness Reliability, 52 VILL. 
L. REV. 679, 686 (2007).  Curiously, passages of this article reappeared verbatim in a redacted 
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Michael used the example of fingerprint identification as an example of the 
extreme relativist position often associated with science studies, and he used 
my discovery of those limits and the necessity for me of distinguishing 
between the limits of scientific knowledge in a strictly epistemological sense 
from limits produced by the fact that this particular group of knowledge-
makers had in fact failed to correctly identify the kind of studies and data 
that would have supported the knowledge claims that they were making and 
thus, not surprisingly failed to amass those studies and data. 
What is interesting and challenging about forensic science, as 
Michael’s paper illustrates, is that debates about philosophy of science are 
not all that helpful in tackling what we might call “the problem” of forensic 
science.  When a discipline has not even framed an empirical question, there 
is little need to debate the merits of relativism versus realism.  Nor, I would 
argue, is it helpful—as so many seem to think it is—to exhort the forensic 
disciplines to fit themselves to a template called “the scientific method” 
constructed around hypothesis testing.  As Michael, drawing on Susan 
Haack, has correctly argued, “scientific method” is more an honorific than a 
universal description of every activity society conventionally calls “science.”  
And yet, forensic disciplinary communities certainly do make scientific 
knowledge of a sort; their claims enjoy broad social acceptance both 
internally and externally.  It is probably fair to say that most of these 
disciplinary communities are still struggling to move forward to more 
defensible knowledge claims, despite more than a decade of work by 
outsiders and insiders trying to push them in this direction.  How and why 
these things happen, it seems to me, are sociological questions.5 
 
(and thus, to me, anonymous) version of a letter supporting my case for promotion to 
Associate Professor with tenure.  When I was being considered for promotion to full 
Professor, Michael dispensed with anonymity entirely.  I was minding my own business one 
weekend afternoon, when my mobile phone rang, and Michael barked, “It’s Michael.  Your 
promotion file.  I agree with almost everything you say.  But publication #3, footnote 26—
explain yourself.”  After a lengthy discussion, we bid goodbye, and I started to tell my spouse, 
“the funniest thing just happened.”  At that point, my mobile phone rang again . . . . 
 5  David Caudill offers such a sociological contribution in this volume.  David Caudill, 
Toward A Sociology of Forensic Knowledge? A (Supplementary) Response to Cole, 48 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 583 (2018).  In this paper, Caudill adopts the perspective of one of the pioneers 
of science studies, Harry Collins.  Collins, somewhat notoriously, has broken with much of 
the field by accusing science studies of leveling expertise in such a way as to afford the views 
of “experts”—however defined—as deserving of no greater weight than laypeople.  In place 
of this leveled view, Collins and his collaborators offer a typology of kinds of expertise.  
Working in this tradition, Caudill shows that for forensic fire analysts—but the point could 
be made equally well for many forensic disciplines—the question of how they make 
knowledge is more fruitfully framed around expertise than around science.  And, he argues 
that it is possible, and perhaps even practically necessary, to imagine a community of fire 
experts who deploy scientific knowledge about the behavior of fire that was made by others 
(by scientists) even though they did not, and perhaps are not even qualified to, generate that 
knowledge themselves.  I agree entirely with this argument.  And, I share Collins’s and 
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For the past eight years, I have begun my writings about forensic reform 
by suggesting that the post-National Research Council (NRC) report (also 
known as the “NAS Report”)6 era, beginning in 2009, is a historic moment 
for American forensic science.  Whether it will go down in history as a 
turning point of reform or a lost opportunity, however, is still not clear.7  In 
2017, it is possible to believe that this year will, when history is written, 
become yet another landmark year because of the closing of the National 
Commission on Forensic Science (NCFS).  Note also that the forensic reform 
efforts of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) 
ended with the Obama Administration.  Likewise, while one can hope that 
the report on forensic science by the President’s Council of Advisors on 
Science and Technology (PCAST) will be influential, PCAST itself is 
completely in abeyance, and will be unable to act on anything, let alone on 
forensic science, during the current administration, and perhaps forever.8  I 
am less certain of 2017’s landmark status than of 2009’s, but it could be. 
 
 
Caudill’s belief that expertise exists, that expertise is not undifferentiated, that it is important 
to articulate the grounds for various expertise, and that it is useful and interesting to move 
beyond the deconstruction of all knowledge claims on to the problem of how we should make 
consequential decisions, despite the fundamental uncertainty of all knowledge claims.  Legal 
disputes are one setting where that issue is forced.  And, I am flattered by both Collins’s and 
Caudill’s use of my own supposed expertise about the scientific validity of fingerprint 
identification—which is quite different from the expertise possessed by a forensic practitioner 
(like Andrew Sulner, see this volume)—as an example of their theory of expertise.  But, I will 
say that I still think today upon reading Caudill’s paper—that a typology of tasks is a more 
useful way of parsing out the intersecting knowledge claims surrounding forensic science than 
a typology of expertise.  Put simply, designing and performing a scientific study to test a 
forensic knowledge claim about the behavior of fire is quite a different task from forming an 
opinion about the origin of a fire in a particular case.  And, consuming, understanding, 
evaluating, and interpreting such a study is a different task still.  So, for these reasons, I have 
always found it more helpful in forensic science to think about tasks than about expertises. 
Space precludes me from saying much more about this, except to note that task is, of course, 
a “Risingerian” word—a concept central to major contribution to the body of scholarship on 
Daubert and Kumho Tire.   
 6  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, STRENGTHENING 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009), https://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf [https://perma.cc/DVV2-6CTZ] [hereinafter NRC 
REPORT].  For the definitive account of how to describe that report, see D. Michael Risinger, 
The NAS/NRC Report on Forensic Science: A Path Forward Fraught with Pitfalls, 2010 
UTAH L. REV. 225, 225 n.2 (2010).   
 7  I do not, of course, mean that forensic reform actually began in 2009.  It began, in 
many ways, years, even decades before that. I mean, rather, that it gained significant 
prominence and momentum with the publication of the NRC Report.  I am suggesting that a 
historian of forensic science writing 50 or 100 years hence might well see 2009 as a particular 
important date.   
 8  PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL 
COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS (2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_foren
sic_science_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/EKZ3-FRA6].   
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One possible reading for future historians of American forensic science 
will, of course, be to read 2017 as the beginning of the end of the historic 
period of forensic reform, which began in 2009.  Most disturbing in this 
regard is the undisguised glee with which interest groups resistant to forensic 
reform, such as the National District Attorneys Association, greeted the 
news, which suggests that, contrary to prosecutors’ earlier expressions of 
eagerness to work with other stakeholders on forensic reform, they were in 
fact simply waiting the NCFS out.9  On the other hand, it is also possible to 
read the closing of the NCFS as a mere bump in the road toward forensic 
reform.  Perhaps enough momentum has been built up to move forward.  I 
do not pretend to be able to know at this point which reading is more correct. 
If momentum has been built up, then where will forensic reform come 
from?  Presumably it may come from the disciplines themselves, from 
institutions like the American Academy of Forensic Science (AAFS), the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, state forensic science commissions, the 
innocence movement, Europe, etc.  None of these entities, however, has the 
type of broad official remit over all of American forensic science that the 
NCFS had.  There is only one entity remaining with that broad remit: the 
Organization of Scientific Area Committees (OSAC) administered by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 
In this sense, in 2017, OSAC suddenly became the last organization 
standing of the forensic reform effort that gained significant momentum 
from the NRC in 2009.  One thing that is curious about this is that OSAC 
does not, at first glance, seem to have a mandate to reform all of forensic 
science.  OSAC has a rather limited mandate centered around standards.  To 
be sure, the absence of standards has long been considered one of the 
weaknesses of American forensic science, which many scholars and the 
NRC report have mentioned prominently.  But the absence of standards is 
hardly the only problem with contemporary American forensic science, and, 
arguably, it is not the most important or most interesting problem.  A brief 
survey of general problems with American forensic science might, in 
addition to standards, include: 
 
 Forensic science is inadequately resourced by governments to 
do what is asked of it. 
 Forensic science is insufficiently connected to “mainstream” 
science or “national science assets.” 
 
 9  Spencer S. Hsu, Sessions Orders Justice Department to End Forensic Science 
Commission, Suspend Review Policy, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/local/public-safety/sessions-orders-justice-dept-to-end-forensic-science-commissi
on-suspend-review-policy/2017/04/10/2dada0ca-1c96-11e7-9887-1a5314b56a08_story.html
?utm_term=.0f9299da7163 [https://perma.cc/WP75-53Y9].   
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 Forensic science testimony and reporting often invokes logical 
fallacies (e.g., “the prosecutor’s fallacy”). 
 Forensic science testimony and reporting often over-claims—
that is, overstates the probative value of the evidence. 
 Many forensic techniques have not been validated. 
 Forensic protocols fail to adopt procedures for minimizing 
confirmation bias that are well established in other areas of 
science. 
 Most forensic laboratories are controlled by law enforcement 
agencies.  This arguably creates potential pro-government bias 
and interferes with forensic scientists’ allegiance to “science.” 
 Insufficient basic research is carried out in forensic science. 
 The system of self-regulation that governs most of forensic 
science is insufficiently rigorous.  Certification of analysts and 
accreditation of laboratories are insufficiently rigorous, not 
mandatory, and controlled by the profession itself to an 
inappropriate degree. 
 Education and training in forensic science are insufficient. 
 Many laboratories’ protocols and quality assurance/ control 
mechanisms are insufficiently rigorous. 
 Forensic science lacks a sense of intellectual curiosity that 
would prompt research into answering basic empirical 
questions about the performance of various assays. 
 Forensic science does not embody a sufficient commitment to 
the spirit of open inquiry to justify its self-conceptualization as 
“science.” 
 The defensiveness and hostility of forensic science to 
exogenous criticism and efforts at partnership from academia 
is inconsistent with its self-conceptualization as “science.”10 
 
If I had to choose the most important of these, I would probably pick 
“validation” rather than “standards.” “Standards” is only one of the four or 
five or nine11 prongs of the Daubert legal standard for scientific evidence.  
And, again, it is arguably not the most important one; the most important one 
 
 10  Simon A. Cole, The Innocence Crisis and Forensic Science Reform, in WRONGFUL 
CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 167–68 (Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano eds., 
2014).   
 11  For a description of the many ways one can characterize the number of “Daubert 
factors,” see Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert Reliability: 
How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 15, 32 n.64 
(2003).   
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may well be “validation,” or, as it is called in Daubert, “testing.”12 
The focus on standards is, of course, a consequence of the choice of 
NIST as the scientific agency to co-coordinate the forensic reform effort with 
the Department of Justice (DOJ).  This choice itself, as is well known, came 
after the NRC considered and rejected a number of federal scientific 
agencies, such as the National Science Foundation, to spearhead the forensic 
reform effort.  The NRC ended up advocating that an entirely new agency be 
created.13  The NRC also explicitly recommended against locating the 
forensic reform effort in the DOJ, a recommendation that was, crucially, 
rejected in the formation of the NCFS. 
By the time it became clear that the NRC’s envisioned new forensic 
scientific agency was not going to be created, and that the DOJ was going to 
be heavily involved in the forensic reform effort, the splitting of 
responsibility between the DOJ and NIST had begun to seem to forensic 
reformers as perhaps the best deal that could be had.  The NCFS was, at least, 
not completely controlled by the DOJ.  And NIST was a respected agency 
that was viewed as having a true scientific orientation—that is, an orientation 
around scientific truth and knowledge.  NIST, of course, also had some 
historic and contemporary involvement both in forensic science and in 
cognate areas like biometrics.14 
Despite its scientific credentials, there were some oddities about NIST 
as the lead scientific agency for forensic science.  The chief one, which 
became clear as work began, was NIST’s understandable insistence on 
sticking to its mission as an agency oriented toward the production of 
standards.15  NIST did not have a broad mandate to engage in the production 
of knowledge in the service of the justice system, if it was not connected to 
standards.  The area in which this issue most clearly manifested itself was in 
the area of validation.  Some scholars and members of the NCFS objected to 
the logic of creating standards for disciplines, assays, or procedures, which 
had not yet been validated.  What was the point of creating standards for 
something that was not validated?  Surely, validation should come first.  But 
come from where? Who would do this validation, and who could create the 
incentive structure for validation to get done?  This, of course, brought us 
back to the question of why validation had not been done in the first place.  
 
 12  Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of “Appropriate Validation” in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Interpreted in Light of the Broader Rationalist Tradition, 
Not the Narrow Scientific Tradition, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735, 735–38 (2003).   
 13  NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 19. 
 14  Rich Press, Who Was Detective X?, NIST (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.nist.gov/feat
ured-stories/who-was-detective-x [https://perma.cc/P2VT-EFD5]. 
 15  Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., NIST Mission, Vision, Core Competencies, and Core 
Values (July 10, 2009), https://www.nist.gov/about-nist/our-organization/mission-vision-
values [https://perma.cc/8U2K-B8XC] (updated Jan. 26, 2017). 
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Historically, there has been little incentive structure for validation in 
American forensic science. Instead, there has been a disincentive for 
conducting validation studies owing to the permissiveness of the legal 
regime toward extreme scientific claims that could be made without 
validation.  NIST was reluctant to take on the mission of validating all 
forensic disciplines, assays, and procedures. Instead, NIST was willing to 
perform some validation research and to serve as a central evaluator for the 
justice system of such research, which might be performed by others.16 
So have we ended up at a point where, of all the problems with forensic 
science that have been identified, for historically contingent reasons, only 
the problem of “standards” will be dealt with?  That, of course, is probably 
not the case.  It is probably not the case because, as the emerging “sociology 
of standards” has pointed out, standard setting can be viewed as a form of 
regulation by other means.  In this sense, by creating standards, OSAC can, 
in theory, regulate all or nearly all of American forensic science.  Nearly 
everything can be covered by standards. 
In this sense, we might view the impending period of standard-setting 
as a stage in the historical effort to regulate American forensic science.  
Therefore, it is perhaps helpful to review that history.  It is, however, also 
perhaps helpful to consider the unique obstacles to regulation of forensic 
science, as opposed to other forms of science.  I have argued elsewhere that 
many of the self-regulatory features thought to apply to science seem less 
applicable to forensic science.17  Science, especially academic science, is 
generally thought to operate under a prestige economy in which reputation 
matters more than money.18  To be sure, this claim is both oversimplified and 
dated.  Even so, there remains something to it.  Implicit threats to reputation 
are assumed to deter wrongdoing, such as scientific fraud and even just bad 
science. 
Few forensic scientists live in this prestige economy in which 
reputational rewards are allocated in the form of citations for prestigious 
scientific publications.  Rather, they operate in a much more bureaucratic 
structure within police organizational hierarchies with productivity 
 
 16  Nat’l Comm. on Forensic Sci., Recommendation to the Attorney General, Technical 
Merit Evaluation of Forensic Science Methods and Practices (Sept. 12, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/page/file/905541/download [https://perma.cc/2RW5-
FXHN] (recommending “NIST’s evaluation may include but is not limited to: a) research 
performed by other agencies and laboratories, b) its own intramural research program, or c) 
research studies documented in already published scientific literature.”).   
 17  Simon A. Cole, Forensic Culture as Epistemic Culture: The Sociology of Forensic 
Science, 44 STUD. IN HIST. & PHIL. OF BIOLOGICAL & BIOMEDICAL SCI. 36 (2013). 
 18  See generally BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS 187–230 (1979); M.J. Mulkay, Geoffrey N. Gilbert & 
Steve Woolgar, Problem Areas and Research Networks in Science, 9 SOC. 187, 195 (1975).   
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requirements.19  Their products are not scientific paper, but reports, which 
are not cited, but merely consumed and then discarded by the criminal justice 
system.  These reports are not shared with peers in the conventional sense, 
and they rarely, if ever, generate reputational rewards for their authors.  This 
situation means that the regulation of forensic science cannot come about 
merely through what is often called “scientific culture.”  It needs to come 
from elsewhere: perhaps from the bureaucratic structure itself, perhaps from 
governments, perhaps from the consumers of the evidence. 
A. Self-Regulation 
Forensic disciplines have called for governments to regulate them since 
the early twentieth century.20  These calls have been unsuccessful.21  
American governments have showed little interest in regulating forensic 
science, leading to the oft-remarked situation that hairdressing and pet food 
production are more rigorously regulated by government than forensic 
science. 
Part of the reason for this disinterest was that governments tend not to 
regulate professionals.  They tend to self-regulate.  This eventually became 
clear to the forensic community, generating calls for self-regulation, again 
as early as the 1920s and 1930s.  The general consensus, however, is that 
forensic organizations, both the discipline-specific ones and the broader 
ones, such as the American Academy of Forensic Science and the American 
Society of Crime Laboratory Directors, did a poor job of self-regulation.22 
B. Legal Regulation 
Courts can play a role in regulating forensic science.  Courts are, in 
some sense, the leading, or perhaps sole, consumers of most forensic science.  
This gives them great market power over forensic science, should they 
choose to use it.  This power could be exerted through legal opinions 
establishing various requirements for forensic science to be used in trials and 
other legal proceedings.  Such requirements would presumably be highly 
influential over forensic science, given the understanding that the criminal 
proceeding is in some sense the hypothetical telos of all forensic evidence, 
 
 19  See generally Marie-Eve Sylvestre, Policing the Homeless in Montreal: Is this Really 
What the Population Wants?, 20 POLICING & SOC. 432, 451 (2010). 
 20  For fingerprints, see SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF 
FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 210–11 (2001) (discussing efforts to regulate 
fingerprint identification in the 1930s).  
 21  See generally Paul Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need 
to Regulate Crime Labs, N.C. L. REV. 86, 163–235 (2007). 
 22  Id. at 235 (“Paradoxically, the most scientifically sound procedure—DNA analysis—
is the most extensively regulated, while many forensic techniques with questionable scientific 
pedigrees go completely unregulated.”). 
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whether the forensic evidence is actually used in that criminal proceeding or 
not.23 
Courts have done very little to use this market power to regulate 
forensic science.  Indeed, quite the opposite; courts have largely allowed 
forensic science to remain unregulated and even provided disincentives to 
regulate.  This is arguably the principal message of the NRC report, in its 
perhaps most famous line, that many forensic disciplines remain invalidated 
and courts have been “utterly ineffective” in regulating these disciplines.24 
Interestingly, a recent discussion paper describing “Potential Concepts 
for OSAC 2.0” included, among four potential concepts, a “Federal/State/
Local Partnership” concept.25  This concept consists essentially of legal 
regulation.  OSAC would abandon the writing of standards and shift its focus 
to the writing of model legislation.  The contemplated reforms of forensic 
science would be promulgated because they are required by law, not because 
they are “standard.”  Adoption of this concept would signify an embrace of 
legal regulation, although the mechanism would be legislative rather than 
judicial. 
C. Government Regulation 
In the absence of effective self- or legal regulation, thoughts turn once 
again toward government regulation.  This was the solution to the ills of 
forensic science the NRC proposed in 2009: a standalone federal agency 
dedicated to regulating forensic science in all aspects.26  It is also the solution 
adopted in the United Kingdom, which has a position called, literally, the 
Forensic Science Regulator. 
The NCFS, as noted above, was the government’s effort towards 
government regulation of forensic science.  It was, of course, not the agency 
envisioned by the NRC: it was not permanent, it had no enforcement 
authority, and it was controlled by law enforcement rather than independent 
entities.  Despite all this, it was the most ambitious effort at government 
regulation of forensic science in American history. 
Now, it has been closed by a change in presidential administration.27  In 
a bizarre way, the otherwise reactionary comments on the PCAST report by 
The American Congress of Forensic Science Laboratories (ACFSL)—an 
 
 23  William C. Thompson, The National Research Council’s Plan to Strengthen Forensic 
Science: Does the Path Ahead Run Through the Courts?, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 35, 51 (2009). 
 24  NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 109. 
 25  Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., Potential Concepts for OSAC 2.0 (2017), 
https://www.nist.gov/topics/forensic-science/potential-concepts-osac-20 
[https://perma.cc/X549-NL6Z]. 
 26  See NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 19.   
 27  See Hsu, supra note 9. 
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organization subtitled “The United States Assembly of Forensic Science 
Laboratory Professionals” which, despite the grandiose name, is not a 
particularly well-established or representative forensic organization but 
rather a more self-appointed group—have proven to be remarkably 
prescient: 
 
Interestingly, the PCAST report comes during a presidential 
administration that has demonstrated a deep sensitivity to the 
needs and demands of trial attorneys, criminal defendants, and 
advocates of sweeping criminal justice reform.  Future 
administrations may take a different approach, tending to 
champion positions traditionally held by police and prosecutors.  
We have no opinion in these matters.  But these swings in 
ideological perspective cause commensurate changes in how 
forensic science and its role in our criminal justice system are 
perceived.  In the current political climate, forensic science is 
looked upon with far more suspicion and, in some cases, distain 
than would be the case in other political circumstances.  And 
because forensic science is both expected and apt to remain 
independent of these political currents, it is vulnerable to being 
misportrayed and even bullied in a way that compromises its 
occupational stability.  To truly strengthen forensic science, 
therefore, it will be necessary to somehow insulate it from the 
turbulence caused by changes in political winds.  PCAST did no 
favors in this regard.28 
 
Thus, the ACFSL blunted the key asset of PCAST’s intervention into 
forensic science.  Unlike commissions composed by stakeholders, like 
NCFS, the NRC committee, and, to a lesser extent, OSAC, PCAST is a 
purely scientific body with extremely strong credentials in what 
conventionally counts as “scientific prestige.”  It intervened in a controversy, 
in which it was widely alleged that science had become politicized, primarily 
through the forensic scientists’ excessive orientation toward law 
enforcement.  ACFSL adopted the now-familiar perversion of relativist 
sociology of science—that all science is “mere” politics, and, therefore, 
equally undeserving of trust—to cast PCAST as a political body and law-
enforcement-employed forensic scientists as politically neutral.  This 
argument turns the ideal that we go to governmental or quasi-governmental 
bodies for politically neutral scientific advice on its head.29  This then, leads 
 
 28  Am. Congress of Forensic Sci. Labs., The 2016 PCAST Report, Position Statement, 
(Sept. 21, 2016). 
 29  See, e.g., STEPHEN HILGARTNER, SCIENCE ON STAGE: EXPERT ADVICE AS PUBLIC 
DRAMA (2000); SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 
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to the absurd argument that no government-sponsored scientific advice 
should ever be heeded because such advice is purportedly endlessly subject 
to revision through elections.  Forensic science should be left autonomous, 
immune to any intervention from any government-associated scientific 
advice.  This was a laughable argument until Election Day 2016 at which 
point it suddenly, unexpectedly became devastatingly prescient. 
II. HISTORY OF AMERICAN FORENSIC SCIENCE STANDARDS 
Given the obstacles along all the other routes toward regulation of 
forensic science, it is tempting to think of standard-setting as a plausible 
means of regulating forensic science.  This is not unreasonable.  In many 
other settings, standards have served as alternatives to regulation by states, 
organizations, or social conventions.30  Can standards regulate forensic 
science?  In order to answer this question, we will first turn to a brief history 
of standards in American forensic science and then turn to what the emergent 
sociology of standards and standardization might have to say about that 
question.31 
As of the late 1980s, with perhaps one minor exception,32 there were no 
specifically “forensic science” standards promulgated by any recognized 
standards development organization in the United States.  Indeed, each 
laboratory or practitioner was free to adhere to whatever practices might 
appeal to them, based on whatever were regarded as standard textbooks or 
authorities in any individual field.  The state of the profession in regard to 
standards relating to validity and standard practice to ensure accuracy is well 
described in Peterson et al. (1989).33  However, this was about to change. 
In the late 1980s, there was an increase in the criticism of various 
forensic disciplines based on lack of standard practices and validation from 
both inside and outside forensic science.34  Whether this was the spur is hard 
 
(1990).  
 30  Stefan Timmermans & Steven Epstein, A World of Standards But Not a Standard 
World: Toward a Sociology of Standards and Standardization, 36 ANN. REV. SOC. 69, 71 
(2010).   
 31  Id.   
 32  There was an early run at creating a standard-setting effort in the early 1970s, and in 
fact a committee of the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), Committee E-
30 on forensic science, was established on the request of members of the forensic science 
community in 1970, but it apparently remained virtually inactive.  Committee E-30 had 
nominal subcommittees, including E-30-02 on document examination.  The first and only 
standard promulgated by E-30 before the 1990s was E444: Standard Descriptions of Scope of 
Work Relating to Forensic Document Examiners (1972).   
 33  Joseph L. Peterson & John E. Murdock, Forensic Science Ethics: Developing an 
Integrated System of Support and Enforcement, 34 J. FORENSIC SCI. 749 (1989).   
 34  See, e.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 109 (1991), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/assets/articlePDFs/v04/04HarvJLTech1
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to establish specifically, but for whatever reason, members of the forensic 
science community reached out to the American Society for Testing and 
Materials (ASTM, now ASTM International) in order to initiate an effective 
standards effort in regard to at least some parts of forensic science35  ASTM 
was the oldest and largest “standards developing organization” (SDO) for 
consensus standards in the United States, and one of the oldest in the world.  
Its standards for industrial materials and processes were widely used and 
respected.  Apparently (I say apparently because the specifics of this are hard 
to run down), anyone who appeared to be involved in a respectable enterprise 
in need of standards could join the ASTM and precipitate the formation of a 
committee to generate such standards.  I say “respectable enterprise” because 
it is not clear that a group of astrologers seeking standards generated through 
the ASTM consensus process would have been allowed to form a committee, 
but it is not clear that they would not have been allowed to, or what criteria 
were in place to distinguish between enterprises like astrology and those who 
would be allowed to join and form a committee. 
At any rate, in 1989, the ASTM was approached by members of the 
forensic science community who were then allowed to reorganize and 
rejuvenate the non-functioning ASTM committee E-3036 on forensic science 
as a functioning standards committee.  It is clear that one of the main movers 
of this effort was John Lentini, who saw advantages in the process both for 
promulgation and standardization of more valid procedures, and also for 
raising the status of those performing the procedures.  In explaining this, 
Lentini wrote in 1995: 
 
The impetus for standardization comes from several directions.  
Laboratories seeking accreditation can refer to Standard Test 
Methods for their written procedures, rather than re-inventing the 
wheel.  Bodies that administer examinations for certification of 
individuals can have a body of knowledge from which to draw 
their examination materials.  And, competent individuals 
performing valid tests will have an authoritative source to lend 
credibility to their conclusions, and to question the credibility of 
improper or invalid methodology.37 
 
Lentini’s influence on the early product of E-30 is clear.  Lentini is one 
of the leading fire investigators in the world and was a leader in bringing 
 
09.pdf [https://perma.cc/5C3A-PC9D]. 
 35  John J. Lentini, ASTM Standards for Forensic Sciences, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI. 146, 146 
(1995). 
 36  Peterson & Murdock, supra note 33.  
 37  Lentini, supra note 35, at 146.   
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more scientific approaches to the field even then.  More than a third of the 
first twenty standards promulgated by committee E-30 and its 
subcommittees38 by 1995 dealt with fire investigation.  The source of those 
standards, as Lentini indicates in his article,39 were standards put forth in 
1988 by the International Association of Arson Investigators (IAAI), of 
which Lentini was a member.  The IAAI was not a standards development 
organization, and the advantages of obtaining ASTM status and blessing for 
their product were obvious. 
It is of some interest that an early adopter of the rejuvenated ASTM 
process for setting standards was forensic document examination.40  Perhaps 
it was because there was a forensic document examination subcommittee in 
the original non-functioning ASTM E-30.  Perhaps it was because forensic 
document examination came under significant criticism for weak validation 
in the late 1980s,41 and the attraction of having “an authoritative source to 
lend credibility to their conclusions” in Lentini’s words, was not lost on the 
practitioners of that discipline. 
At any rate, upon reflection, it seems that a consensus standards 
promulgation process as it is normally conceived did not fit the context of 
forensic science very well, and certainly not as the ASTM E-30 and its 
subcommittees functioned in the 1990s, and even beyond.  In most standard-
setting processes, the overarching assumption is that they are best when 
emerging from a process where representatives of all “stakeholders” are 
assembled in a group and must dicker over the contours of the standard in 
issue.  This approach assumes that there will be a variety of interested parties 
involved in the process, some of whom would benefit from laxer standards, 
and some from stricter standards, but all of whom have an interest in some 
standard emerging to establishing a baseline for the practice of the mutually 
dependent enterprises of the stakeholders.42  The members of these forensic 
 
 38  At the time of Lenitini’s article, there were three area subcommittees of E-30; 
Criminalistics (E-30-01), Document Examination (E-30-02) and forensic engineering (E-30-
03). Id. at 146–47.   
 39  Id. at 146.  
 40  Andrew Sulner, Critical Issues Affecting the Reliability and Admissibility of 
Handwriting Identification Opinion Evidence—How They Have Been Addressed (or Not) 
Since the 2009 NAS Report, and How They Should Be Addressed Going Forward: A 
Document Examiner Tells All, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 631 (2018) (“The FDE community has 
been more active than any other forensic discipline in producing professional standards, 
having published an array of twenty-one standards through ASTM International, a private 
consensus standards development organization (SDO).”). 
 41  D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: 
The Lessons of Handwriting Identification ‘Expertise,’ 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1989). 
 42  This is best illustrated, perhaps, by a simple example involving standards for the 
tensile strength of iron bars used to reinforce concrete (“rebar”).  Manufacturers of such bars 
have an interest in a lower standard, and, therefore, an easier-to-produce and cheaper product.  
Immediate “consumers” who produce reinforced concrete works of various sorts have an 
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subcommittees might have some conflicting interests (government employed 
practitioners vs. private practitioners, for instance), but they were all 
members of the same guild group with group commitment to the general 
validity of the enterprise as practiced by the best practitioners.  Absent were 
representatives of the consumers of their product (the courts and the criminal 
defendants who were the ultimate parties forced to consume the product), or 
of the general public interest, or of neutral scientists who were committed to 
the notion of validity generally. 
As the ASTM process proceeded through the mid-1990s, two major 
events impacted the state of play.  One was, of course, Daubert and its 
progeny.  The other was the Justice Department’s/FBI’s response to 
Daubert, and also to the weaknesses in the FBI laboratory revealed by the 
Inspector General’s report on the explosives testimony in the first World 
Trade Center bombing.43  That response was to establish “technical working 
groups” (TWGs) in virtually every forensic area to propose improvements to 
practice (or to bless current practice, depending on your perspective).  This 
effort got started in 1995, and by the time the name of these bodies was 
changed from TWGs to “scientific working groups” (SWGs) in 1998 (in 
what appeared to some a cold-blooded public relations gambit), the main 
action in most areas had moved from the ASTM to the SWGs.  The 
membership in ASTM subcommittees was essentially voluntary and open, 
but the membership in the SWGs was controlled by the FBI and dominated 
by practitioners from government labs, and was thus even less representative 
than the ASTM subcommittees.  SWG products might be high quality, but 
an SWG was not an SDO, so its products did not result in anything but a 
more or less respected opinion by the SWG.  At some point the SWG 
products were sometimes subject to attempts to run them through “standards 
developing organizations” (SDOs) like ASTM, but not always.  In any event, 
all of the loci of professional and standards-developing reflection upon 
 
interest in higher standards as long as the standards are not so demanding as to drive up the 
prices to a point of diminishing demand, and therefore profits.  Consumers of the product of 
the reinforced concrete industry may have an interest in even stronger standards for ensuring 
the longevity, and sometimes the safety, of the products they acquire (concrete roadbeds, pre-
cast concrete members in the construction of bridges or buildings, etc.).  The public interest 
may be represented by various government entities who are themselves consumers of the 
product for public works.  The assumption of the “consensus standard” standard setting 
process is that if you get a properly selected and balanced representation of all stakeholders, 
and therefore all competing interests, into a room (literally or virtually) over a long enough 
period of time, a standard will emerge that will appropriately take into account and balance 
all interests. It is further assumed that this standard will thereafter become formally binding 
in specific circumstances by being incorporated into contracts, and indeed, become more 
generally binding by becoming industry practice, and therefore being available to courts to 
resolve various disputes in litigation even when not specifically referenced in a contract.   
 43  See generally JOHN F. KELLY & PHILLIP K. WEARNE, TAINTING EVIDENCE: INSIDE THE 
SCANDALS AT THE FBI CRIME LAB (1998).   
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various forensic science areas and techniques were concentrated among 
forensic science practitioners until the coming of the NAS committee in 2006 
and the issuance of their report in 2009. 
A. Standards as Regulation 
Can we optimistically hope that standard-setting, in the form of OSAC, 
can make significant progress toward the reform of American forensic 
science?  The sociology of standards and standardization gives reasons for 
both pessimism and optimism. 
One thing that the sociology of standards makes clear is that standard-
setting is far from a uniform activity.  Standard-setting takes many forms, 
sets out with a variety of goals, and follows contingent pathways.44 
Not all standardization is aimed at reform.  The goals of standardization 
can range from aspirational to reflecting the status quo: “standards can imply 
a lowest common denominator of available options, the power of the 
strongest party in standardization, a negotiated order among some or all 
stakeholders, or a confirmation of how things are done by most parties.”45  A 
key question that has emerged already is whether the OSAC standards should 
be aspirational—should articulate where we want forensic science 
eventually to be—or should reflect the status quo.  It has already become 
clear that, while forensic reformers may assume that OSAC standards should 
be aspirational, others believe they should reflect the current practice. 
B. Committee Composition 
Sociologies of standards note, not surprisingly, that the composition of 
committees can affect the outcome of standardization activities.  
“Standardization by committee leads to compromises, bitterly contested 
power plays, and negotiations . . . [s]imilarly, a strong personality can 
influence the creation of standards,” and, “[t]he composition of standard 
committees inevitably creates an institutional bias.”46  The composition of 
committees has already emerged as an issue for OSAC.  The process began 
with a clear quota system for assembling committees: 70% practitioners, 
20% researchers, and 10% “R&D partners,” which presumably means 
industry.47  Already, this might be thought to heavily favor practitioners who 
may be oriented toward the aforementioned status quo.  For example, 
 
 44  Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 30, at 70.   
 45  Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 30, at 79.   
 46  Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 30, at 77.   
 47  Org. for Scientific Area Comms. (OSAC) for Forensic Sci., Terms of Reference for the 
Scientific Area Committee (SAC) Subcommittees, Version 1.3 (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://workspace.forensicosac.org/higherlogic/ws/public/download/7797/FSSB_OSAC%20
ToR%20SAC%20SC_V1.3.pdf [https://perma.cc/C38B-WRLS].   
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PCAST commented: “OSAC’s membership includes relatively few 
independent scientists: it is dominated by forensic professionals, who make 
up more than two thirds of its members . . . PCAST concludes that OSAC 
lacks sufficient independent scientific expertise and oversight to overcome 
the serious flaws in forensic science.”48  However, there is also some 
evidence that some of the subcommittees had not even followed the quota 
system in their composition. This may have skewed subcommittees even 
further toward practitioners.49  Similar complaints have been made about the 
composition of the American of Academy of Forensic Science Standards 
Board (ASB) Consensus Bodies, which comprise the SDOs for OSAC.50 
The ASB uses a more differentiated set of occupational categories 
called “Interest Categories”: 
 
 User/Government 
 User/Industry 
 Producers 
 Laboratories and/or Testing Facilities 
 Consumer Groups 
 Academia 
 Subject Matter Experts 
 General Interest51 
 
This list certainly seems to reflect a more generic understanding of a 
properly composed standardization committee than OSAC’s, which seems 
specifically directed at forensic science.  The ASB procedures do not specify 
quotas for each interest group, but rather state that no interest group should 
have more than one third of the members of the body.52 
 
 48  President’s Council of Advisors on Sci. & Tech., supra note 8, at 126.   
 49  The two DNA subcommittees show that the “DNA2” subcommittee does indeed have 
20% researchers, but the “DNA1” subcommittee has only three (15%) academic researchers, 
as well as three current or former practitioners who are classified as researchers in part. John 
M. Butler, The National Commission on Forensic Science and the Organization of Scientific 
Area Committees, Address at Proceedings of the International Symposium on Human 
Identification (2014).  In 2014, I complained to the Pattern Evidence Scientific Area 
Committee that they had not even followed the quota system in the composition of the 
subcommittee in which I had the greatest interest: the Friction Ridge Subcommittee.  The 
result of this misallocation was that the friction ridge OSAC had even fewer academic 
credentials than the friction ridge SWG, SWGFAST.  And, recall that, as noted above, the 
SWGs were even less representative than the ASTM committees.   
 50  Letter from Andrew Sulner, Principal Owner, Forensic Document Examinations, LLC 
to Steve Orthey (July 14, 2009) (on file with the author).  
 51  See AAFS Standards Bd., ASB Interest Categories (2017), https://asb.aafs.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/Interest_Categories2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL4H-Y7UE].   
 52  Am. Acad. of Forensic Sci., Procedures for the Development of American National 
COLE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2018  1:14 PM 
2018] WHO WILL REGULATE AMERICAN FORENSIC SCIENCE 579 
A quick glance at the available openings on all the Consensus Bodies 
shows that Consumer Groups is the most under-filled interest category, 
followed by Producers.53  This raises the interesting question of who a 
“consumer” of forensic science is.  The official definition is: “[g]roups, 
individuals, and organizations representing consumer interests including 
safety, health, and environment.  ‘Consumer’ may also be interpreted to 
include any party in judicial proceedings that may include forensic 
evidence.”54 
Some Consumer Group slots are filled by prosecutors.  It is reasonable, 
and arguably correct, to describe prosecutors (and judges) as “consumers” of 
forensic science.  More broadly, the definition might also include defense 
attorneys, innocence advocates, crime victims, or victims of erroneous 
forensic evidence, and perhaps even journalists. 
Interestingly, one of the other “Potential Concepts for OSAC 2.0” 
directly addresses the issue of committee composition.  The title of this 
concept, “Community-based standards,” sounds at first as if it is intended to 
root standards even more deeply into the practitioner community.55  But a 
closer look reveals that this concept proposes to replace the current structure, 
which combines stakeholders on committees and subcommittees (although 
in such a way that practitioners have a supermajority), with a structure in 
which stakeholders are segregated into different committees.  Specifically, 
practitioners would populate the Scientific Area Committees (SACs), and 
“scientists” would populate the Forensic Science Standards Board (FSSB).  
This proposal perhaps reflects disenchantment with the idea that bringing 
stakeholders together will stimulate progress.  It perhaps suggests that some 
believe that practitioners and “scientists” are far enough apart in orientation 
that they need to perform separate tasks. 
It is also worth noting that, given the fanfare surrounding the launch of 
OSAC, a rather formidable hierarchy of committees and subcommittees 
populated by more than 500 individuals total, many (myself included) were 
surprised to learn that OSAC was not going to create standards.  This, as it 
turns out, is a consequence of the fact that NIST, despite its name, is not 
itself a standard-setting organization.  The OSACs, in turn, are not what are 
called in the trade SDOs.  So, an appropriate SDO was sought and found in 
 
Standards, at 2 (2016), https://asb.aafs.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ASB-Procedures.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DZT3-PPEY].  
 53  AAFS Standards Bd., Am. Acad. of Forensic Sci., Proceedings of the American 
Academy of Forensic Sciences, 68th Annual Scientific Meeting (2016), https://asb.aafs.org/
consensus-bodies/ [https://perma.cc/V3WF-RK5E]. 
 54  AAFS Standards Bd., Am. Acad. of Forensic Sci., ASB Interest Categories (2016), 
https://asb.aafs.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/ASB-Interest-Cagegories.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2HLT-SCF7].   
 55  Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., supra note 25. 
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the American Academy of Forensic Sciences Academy Standards Board 
(ASB).  And so, the OSACs are committees that will write proposed 
standards documents and submit them to the ASB.  But so can anyone else.  
Anyone can submit a proposed standard to the ASB.  Hence, perhaps, the 
rethinking entailed by OSAC 2.0. 
C. Implementation 
Regardless of the composition of committees and the content of 
standards, their enforcement and adoption is far from assured.  Given all the 
energy that was invested in the NCFS, it is shocking to realize how weak its 
enforcement power was: non-binding recommendations to the Deputy 
Attorney General to require things of DOJ laboratories only.  It had no power 
whatsoever over laboratories in other jurisdictions, where most forensic 
science still occurs. 
Sociologists of standards note that “the power of standardization 
depends on whether standards are actually implemented.”56  One might adapt 
for standards the old adage about academic articles: most are never cited; 
many are never read.  Likewise, “[c]ountless standards do nothing.”57  
Sociologists point out that “the world is awash in competing standards,” and, 
therefore, “standards risk remaining paper tigers unless they are widely 
adopted.”58  They add that “[t]he voluntary nature of many standards makes 
it difficult to develop momentum unless built-in incentives promote 
compliance.”59  These incentives might range from government 
requirements to peer pressure—a “crowd effect.”60  It is possible to imagine 
both of these incentives having an effect on forensic science—governments 
requiring crime laboratories to conform to standards, or crime laboratories 
conforming to standards because most of their peers do—but it is at least 
equally possible that these incentives are not effective. 
Thus, even if the OSAC standardization process goes well, 
implementation is an open question.  Sociologists note that “[s]tandards 
often require an auxiliary system that provides internal or external 
incentives, audits, and certification.  Standards may fail implementation for 
countless reasons, including lack of knowledge, lack of compliance, 
immediate conversion of standards, resistance, adaptation, or usurpation.  
Very few standards work as intended by the designers of standards because 
they are tinkered with, whether slightly or fundamentally.”61  These may be 
 
 56  Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 30, at 79. 
 57  Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 30, at 81. 
 58  Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 30, at 79. 
 59  Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 30, at 79. 
 60  Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 30, at 79. 
 61  Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 30, at 81. 
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discouraging thoughts for those hopeful about the OSAC standards. 
Of course, sociologists of standards point out that there are many ways 
for standards to “succeed.”  Some succeed entirely through persuasive, rather 
than legal or market, force.  Some succeed symbolically; no one really 
follows the standards, but they change the conversation.62  Some, it is 
claimed, succeed through their very flexibility, by being broad enough to 
accommodate various and changing practices.63 
Has NIST’s OSAC assembled just the right mix of scientific firepower, 
practitioner buy-in, consumer pressure, government power, cultural change, 
and persuasive force to be the entity that finally reforms forensic science?  
We cannot yet know, but the task is daunting. 
 
 
 62  Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 30, at 82. 
 63  Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 30, at 81. 
